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TOXIC SPILL LEGISLATION: DOES IT WORK?
INTRODUCTION

The problem of toxic spills has risen to crisis proportions. Storage tanks, often grouped together in locations referred to as tank
farms, are present throughout the country. These tanks are located
both aboveground and belowground, and contain various liquids
ranging from benzene to petroleum. The tanks can be found at large
refineries, gas stations, farms, and even in the basements or yards of
many homes. The mere existence of these tanks, in and of themselves, poses no threat. However, the possibility of accidental tank
spills are an ever-present danger.1 Tank spills cause millions of dollars worth of property damage and are an undue burden on our natural resources.
The United States Congress has attempted to eliminate these
spills and their resulting damage on the environment through several
pieces of legislation. While some of this legislation has been successful in many respects, most has fallen short of the mark. This is attributable to the fact that Congress has never purported to regulate
all tanks, nor has it attempted to regulate all types of spills. This
lack of widespread regulation has eviscerated the frequency of spills
by providing polluters with the ability to circumvent the law.
The judiciary also has ineffectively confronted the problem of
toxic spills and their consequential damage. The courts have long
recognized the need for some form of landowner liability when a
landowner's actions adversely effect the use and enjoyment of an1. These tanks are constructed to hold various liquid substances. The problems associated with the spills are exacerbated when the tanks are used to store substances other than the
ones they are designed for, and when tank farms are used as unlicensed hazardous waste sites.
Both of these uses were employed in New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1985), notwithstanding the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 1987). In Shore
Realty, the present land owner, who was not the polluter, was held liable for the costs of
cleaning property that had hazardous wastes stored in forty year old aboveground storage
tanks. The property was not a licensed hazardous waste storage facility, and the tanks were
allowed to fall into disrepair which resulted in corrosion and consequential leaking. Liability
was predominantly based on a theory of public nuisance. Only a small portion of the liability,
approximating $30,000, was based on CERCLA. Id.
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other's property. It is well settled that an unnatural use of land results in liability to the owner if such use damages adjacent property.
Unfortunately, toxic spills threaten more than just surrounding land.
As a result, the traditional common law approach to nuisance law
has proven ineffective in preventing spills.
Despite the attempts made by both Congress and the judiciary
to eliminate the incidence of spills, it is clear that more drastic measures must be taken, as the negative effects of pollution are far
reaching. For example, in September of 1986 it was discovered that
the inadequate maintenance of aboveground storage tanks, located in
South Dakota and owned by the Williams Pipeline Company, ultimately resulted in the seepage of 20,000 gallons of petroleum into
the ground.3 Consequently, the Skunk Creek underground aquifer
was contaminated. An elementary school was forced to permanently
close as well.' A more recent example occurred January 2, 1988 in
Floreffe, Pennsylvania where a storage tank owned by the Ashland
Petroleum Company suddenly ruptured.5 As a consequence of the
2. Rylands v. Fletcher, House of Lords, 1868, L.R.3 H.L. 330. (Liability arose from the
unnatural storage of water on defendant's land for use in defendant's brewery; the water escaped and flooded plaintiffs land).
3. "The discharges ultimately caused . . .the destruction of . . .precious groundwater
supply for generations to come." Oil Spill on the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9,10 (1988) (statement of Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator
from South Dakota). On March 11, 1987 a second spill of 8,000 gallons was reported. "This
spill immediately soaked into the ground and was floating on the aquifer within hours." 135
CONG. REc. 5671 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Daschle). Eleven leaks and
spills occurred before these spills at the tank farm. At the present date, very little has been
cleaned at the site. Id.
4. 135 CONG. REc. 5671 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
5. Oil storage tank number 1338, owned by the Ashland Petroleum Company, was disassembled and moved to the Floreffe, Pennsylvania tank farm where it was reassembled with
new bottom plates and a new foundation in 1986. The tank entered into service on August 24,
1987. The tank had been tested by filling it with water to a level of five feet one inch for a
bottom leak check. In addition, radiographs, a procedure to check welds, were performed on
the joints and welds to detect any flaws. No flaws were found.
On January 2, 1988 the tank was filled with number two diesel oil. Previously, it had not
been filled past a height of thirty-eight feet. Ten minutes after the oil reached a height of
forty-five feet ten and one quarter inches (the tank had a maximum capacity of forty-six feet)
a flaw in the steel of the tank, which existed since the tank's 1940 manufacturing date, gave
way and started a rupture that immediately propagated the entire vertical length of the tank.
The flaw was not detected because it was close to, but not part of, a weld, and was therefore
not radiographed. Failure Investigation of Ashland Oil Tank No. 1338 at Floreffe, Pennsylvania, Battelle Report June 17, 1988 at 1-3, 9, 149-51. Oil Spill on the Monongahela and Ohio
Rivers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 50 (1988) (statement of John R.
Hall, Chairman and CEO of Ashland Oil, Inc.)
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inundation of the containment structure by almost four million gallons of number two diesel fuel, approximately 750,000 gallons of the
fuel spilled into the Monongahela River, polluting it for miles.6 Ashland only recovered approximately fifteen percent of the oil from the
river. 7 The remaining fuel, consisting of approximately 600,000 gallons, flowed down the Monongahela River, eventually reaching the
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.' Over one million people were affected
by this discharge, 1,200 of whom were immediately evacuated from
their homes due to the possibility of fire. Communities that drew
water from the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers were forced to shut
their water intake systems in an effort to prevent contamination of
treatment plants. Water had to then be transported into these areas
from external sources. Such transportation lasted for over a week in
some communities. As a result, many businesses closed until the
water supply was restored.' The long term environmental effects of
this disaster are not known, but "may be with us for years."' 10
The traditional common law approach to nuisance law proves
substantially ineffective as applied to the area of toxic pollution. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the judiciary can ever successfully confront the problem of spills, as courts can attempt to compensate the
injured only after the fact. Legislation, however, accompanied by
comprehensive regulations, could decrease the probability of such incidents of pollution from initially occurring, although this approach
has thus far proven ineffective in preventing toxic spills.
This note will analyze the current regulations, focusing on their
shortcomings with regard to tank spills. In addition, it will discuss
the positive and negative aspects of the recently proposed Waste
6. Id.
7. "Although Ashland recovered only about 15 percent [approximately 150,000 gallons] of the oil that entered the Monongahela River, that amount is fairly typical for a river
cleanup." Id. at 111 (statement of Richard S. Golob, Director of World Information Systems
[WIS]).
A slow response rate, emulsification, and the lack of the proper equipment accounts for
the fact that a fifteen percent recovery rate from a river spill is the norm. Most of the oil spill
cleaning equipment that is in use today is designed to clean spills that occur on the open ocean.
This equipment consists mostly of booms with attached skirts that extend below the surface of
the water and force the oil to the surface where it can be skimmed and/or vacuumed. This
equipment does not work in a river where there is a current that will push the oil below the
skirts of the booms, forming small droplets that mix with the water (emulsification) and continue to flow further down the river. Tools' Mismatch to Task Hampering Oil Cleanup, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 6, 1988, at A19, col. 1.
8. 134 CONG. REC. E1209 (daily ed. April 13, 1989) (statement of Rep. Walgren).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Materials Management Act of 1989.
I.

COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION
AND LIABILITY ACT

In 1979, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA")" in an attempt to reduce the environmental threat caused by abandoned hazardous waste dumps. Congress gave teeth to CERCLA by both expanding liability beyond traditional tort theories, 2 and by creating
an exhaustive list of actors (and non-actors) who may be held liable.
The list includes: (1) any owner or operator of a facility that produces the hazardous substances in question;' 3 (2) any owner or operator of the disposal site at the time the hazardous substances were
disposed of;' 4 (3) any person who transported such wastes;' 5 and (4)
any person who arranged, by contract or agreement, for the disposal
of the wastes.16 Under CERCLA, these parties are liable and must
reimburse the government for response costs,' 7 removal or remedial
action costs,' 8 destruction of natural resources,' 9 and the costs of any
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
12. Under the modern theory of tort law, causation is essential for the finding of liability. Traditional tort law even recognizes a defense of causation for strict liability. However,
under CERCLA, a person can be held strictly liable merely for owning land containing hazardous waste. See Shore Realty Corp., supra note 1, at 1042, 1044.
13. "Covered persons ...
[include] the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility...
shall be liable .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). Thus, the person who presently owns the facility
and/or the person who operates the business located on the facility can be held liable. However, "[s]uch term [owner and operator] does not include a person, who, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility." Id. at § 9601(20)(A)(iii). Therefore, the mortgagee
is protected. (The question of foreclosure and consequent liability is beyond the scope of this
Note).
14. "Covered persons ...
[include] any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of . . . shall be liable ....
" Id. at § 9607(a)(2).
15. "Covered persons ... [include] any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to . . . sites . . . from which there is a release . . . of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable ....
" Id. at § 9607(a)(4).
16. "Covered persons . . . [include] any person who by contract . . . arranged for disposal . . . or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal . . . of hazardous substances . . . shall be liable ....
" Id. at § 9607(a)(3).
17. The liability which is imposed on the parties listed in notes 13-16 supra include "any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan." Id. at § 9607(a)(4)(B).
18. The parties listed in notes 13-16 supra are responsible for "all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency plan." Id. at § 9607(a)(4)(A).
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resulting health studies.2 0 The potential liability imposed by CERCLA is quite large in and of itself. Generally it costs the federal
government more to clean up a site than it costs a private party.2
Accordingly, CERCLA creates an added incentive to clean waste
sites after a spill has occurred.
Although positive attributes are found in CERCLA, the Act unfortunately fails in two major respects: first, CERCLA does not directly confront the need to prevent spills, since it is considered only
after a discharge has occurred. Second, CERCLA does not include
petroleum in its definition of a hazardous substance. 2 Considering
that abandoned hazardous waste dumps are an increasing threat to
the environment, and that the fear of liability for the cost of cleanup
acts as a deterrent to a potential dumper, Congress' decision to focus
on abandoned waste dumps may arguably be justified. While CERCLA was never intended to be a regulatory statute, the inclusion of
petroleum in its definition of hazardous substances would indirectly
reduce the number of petroleum spills per year. If an owner could be
held liable by CERCLA after a spill, there would be an incentive for
the owner to take better care of his tanks to prevent a spill. However, by failing to include petroleum spills, Congress has prevented
CERCLA from acting as an indirect form of regulation on above
ground storage tanks.
23
Theoretically, if the tank farm owned by Williams Pipeline
19. The parties listed in notes 13-16 supra are liable for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release." Id. at § 9607(a)(4)(C).
20. The parties listed in notes 13-16 supra are responsible for "the costs of any health
assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title." Id. at
§ 9607(a)(4)(D).
21. It is the general consensus among The Hazardous Waste Bar that it costs the federal
government more to clean a hazardous waste site than it does a private party.
22. CERCLA does not define petroleum as a hazardous waste.
Definitions . . . For the purposes of this subchapter . . . The term "hazardous substance" means . . . any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of
title 33 . . . The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous
substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term
does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic
gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (A). While the substances covered under CERCLA are extremely dangerous
and are of a much higher toxic concentration than petroleum, petroleum has a great potential
for the physical destruction of property and long term environmental pollution. This is evidenced by the fact that oil is covered along with hazardous waste in sections 311 (a) and (b) of
the Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act.
23. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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had discharged substances other then petroleum, CERCLA may

have been useful in assigning liability for the cost incurred to clean
the site. The site may have also been put on the national priorities
list. 2 ' In addition, CERCLA's ability to discourage hazardous waste
dumping25 by instilling fear of liability may have initially prevented
the spill. Thus, by exempting petroleum, Congress has unfortunately
failed to create a multifaceted tool which may have prevented damage in the aforementioned case, as well as in many other similar

situations.
II.

THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 21 is another Congressional attempt to address the waste disposal problem in
the United States. Unlike CERCLA, RCRA does apply to petro27
leum. However, it only purports to regulate underground tanks.
Moreover, a number of such tanks are excluded from the regulation.2 8 The requirements imposed by RCRA section 6991 include:
24. In fact, "[t]he EPA is currently reviewing a portion of the Williams site for possible
inclusion on the Superfund [CERCLA] national priorities list." 135 CONG. REc. 5671 (daily
ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Daschle). The national priorities list is a list of the worst
sites that are slated for cleanup under the Superfund. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982).
25. The term "dumping" is used loosely here because a spill is not technically dumping
in the classic sense of the word.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (Supp. V 1987) was enacted in 1984 to amend the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, which was enacted in 1976.
27. "SUBCHAPTER IX - REGULATION OF UNDERGROUND STORAGE
TANKS . . . The term 'underground storage tank' means any one or combination of tanks
...which is used to contain an accumulation of regulated substances .... " 42 U.S.C. §
6991(1). "The term 'regulated substance' [includes] . . . petroleum." Id. at § 6991(2)(B).
28. The term "underground storage tank" ... does not include any - (A) farm or
residential tank of 1,100 gallons or less capacity used for storing motor fuel for
noncommercial purposes, (B) tank used for storing heating oil for consumptive use
on the premises where stored . . . storage tank situated in an underground area
(such as a basement, cellar, mineworking, drift, shaft, or tunnel) if the storage tank
is situated upon or above the surface of the floor.
Id. at § 6991(l)(A),(B),(I). Unfortunately, a gallon of petroleum has the same potential for
harm whether it leaks from an exempt or non-exempt tank. Notwithstanding the fact that nonexempt tanks may have a larger capacity than exempt tanks, and therefore may be more
harmful, damage can be caused by both exempted and non-exempted tanks. In addition, a
large majority of tanks in the nation today fall into the exempted category, and Congress has
allowed the existence of the significant threat to continue. Congress has created an incentive to
build smaller tanks, but in larger numbers. Thus, a potential polluter who would like to utilize
a 2,000 gallon tank can sidestep the RCRA regulations by using two one-thousand gallon
tanks.
The exception also extends to underground tanks that store fuel for on premises consumption. A leak from these tanks can cause damage as well. A threat is also created by the
mineworking/shaft/tunnel exemption. Id. at § 6991(l)(I). In the case of the mineshaft or
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(1) the maintenance of a leak detection system; (2) an inventory system; (3) a system to test the underground tank; and (4) evidence of
financial responsibility to take corrective action and to compensate
third parties for damage caused by a discharge.2 9 RCRA imposes
regulation both before and after tank. installation by regulating the
periodic maintenance of a tank as well as the procedures for the responsibility of cleanup after there is a discharge.3 0 RCRA provides
for the United States Government or a State Government to issue a
compliance order to the owner or operator of a tank to clean a spill
privately. If the compliance order is disregarded, the federal or state
government can clean up the spill and hold the disregarding party
responsible for the cost.3 1 Such government cleanup efforts inevitably
prove to be more costly than their privately undertaken counterparts.
Thus, as with CERCLA, there is an incentive to prevent toxic leaks,
plus there is the added incentive to promptly clean up the leaks. For
the above reasons, RCRA is a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, since RCRA does not purport to regulate aboveground tanks,
tunnel, the tanks are already deep under the ground. Merely because they are not immediately
surrounded by earth does not mean that a leak will not pollute the groundwater.
29. Id. at §§ 6991b(c)(l),(2),(6) (West Supp. 1984).
30. It should be noted that the discharge from an underground tank is a slow leak and
not the sudden torrent of petroleum that would be caused by the complete failure of an
aboveground tank, such as occurred with the Ashland tank (see supra note 5 and accompanying text). However, the slow leak from an underground tank percolates down to the groundwater which many surrounding communities use for drinking purposes. Unlike surfacewater,
groundwater is extremely difficult and much more costly to clean. It is not difficult to abate the
problem of an underground tank that has a slow leak. One simply has to empty it, and either
plug the leak or decommission the leak by sealing it. See supra note 3, and accompanying text.
Conversely, other than regular maintenance and testing, it is difficult to stop an
aboveground tank from cracking due to a shift in the foundation or an imperfection in the
metal (as occurred in the Ashland collapse, see supra note 5 and accompanying text), causing
a complete rupture of the tank and the consequent discharge of most of its contents. An underground tank will not rupture in this manner because the ground surrounding the tank will act
as a counterbalance to the pressure of the contents stored inside the tank. Therefore, RCRA
would have been more effective if it had included both aboveground and underground tanks as
both are sources of threat to the environment.
31. Whenever costs have been incurred by the Administrator [EPA], or by a state
. . . for undertaking corrective action or enforcement action with respect to the
release of petroleum from an underground storage tank, the owner or operator of
such tank shall be liable to the administrator or the state for such costs. The liability under this paragraph shall be construed to be the standard of liability which
obtains under section 1321 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1987). The money to be used by the government to
clean the site shall be drawn from the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund. Id. at
§ 699lb(h)(2)(C). The advantage of the government authority to clean the site directly is the
ability to timely prevent leaking where there is either a noncomplying owner, an unknown
owner, an owner who can not be located, or an owner who could not afford cleanup.
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and since not all underground tanks are regulated, RCRA32 ultimately
fails to prevent a substantial threat to the environment.
III.

THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION PREVENTION AND
CONTROL ACT

The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") contends that
it has the power to sufficiently regulate aboveground storage tanks
through the Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act,
commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act of 1972.11 The National Contingency Plan ("NCP"), a4 promulgated under section 311
of the Act, provides instructions and procedures for cleaning waterways after a discharge of hazardous substances has occurred. The
NCP suffers however from the same shortcomings as CERCLA
since it is substantially an "after the fact" response mechanism.
Moreover, the NCP only regulates offshore facilities, notwithstanding the fact that subsection (j) of section 311 could be construed,
albeit a broad construction, to give the EPA authority to regulate
onshore facilities,3 5 including aboveground tanks. 36 The enactment of
the Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasures ("SPCC") regulation can be attributed to such a broad construction.3 7
Unfortunately, the SPCC has not been enforced to its full extent. 38 Additionally, the SPCC regulations do not apply if the facil32. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
33. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251-1376 (West 1986).
34. Id. at § 1321(c)(2) (West 1986).
35. Subsection j) reads as follows:
Regulations; penalty . . . Consistent with the National Contingency Plan required
by subsection (c)(2) of this section, as soon as possible after October 18, 1972, and
from time to time thereafter, the President shall issue regulations . . . establishing
methods and procedures for removal of discharged oil and hazardous substances
• . . establishing procedures, methods, and equipment and other requirements for
equipment to prevent discharges of oil . . . from onshore facilities .
and to contain such discharges . ..
33 U.S.C. § 13210)(1)(A)(C). One way to help prevent accidental discharges of oil from
aboveground storage tanks is to formulate a set of regulations requiring scheduled maintenance and testing of a tank itself.
36. Id. at § 13210).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 112 (1988).
38. 134 CONG. REC. E1209 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989).
CURRENT REGULATION . . . of above-ground tanks is limited at best. First,
there is virtually no regulation of the structural strength [of the tanks] required.
There are only voluntary industry practices. Second, there are some regulations for
spill containment, but their enforcement appears to be very irregular. EPA has
never inspected the spill containment system for the Floreffe tank.
Current EPA spill containment regulations are broad and vague, essentially
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ity's storage capacity is less than 1,320 gallons and no single
container has a capacity exceeding 660 gallons.3 9 Furthermore, like
CERCLA and NPC, the SPCC regulates the containment aspect of
a spill but does not provide the measures necessary to prevent a
leaving the industry in the role of setting its own standards, policing its own operations, and conducting its own inspection. For example, the EPA does not require the
SPCC plan to be modified when a tank is relocated or rebuilt until 6 months after
the tank is in operation. [The] EPA regulations allow a new or rebuilt tank to operate without an inspection. The Pittsburgh tank had been, in different phases, under
construction for a year and a half, but Ashland did not amend the spill plan until 2
days after the spill.
Industry standards may be good guidelines, however, they are generally voluntary and give little assurance of safety. Id. (statement of Rep. Walgren).
In addition, it has been stated that inspections which have been undertaken were not conducted properly:
While opponents . . . claim that Section 311 of the Clean Water Act provides ample protection against potential above-ground tank problems, recent history clearly
proves that contention wrong . . . I am advised that tank inspections are sometimes
conducted from planes flying over facilities. I am further advised that insides of
tanks, intake valves, and tank seams are never inspected by the EPA under the
Section 311 program.
The fact is that the existing Clean Water Act authority has proven woefully
inadequate in forcing tank owners to maintain their facilities in a reasonable
manner.
Oil Spill on the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988) (statement of Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator, South Dakota). In addition to this
outside criticism, there is a question of EPA's power to regulate by personnel inside of the
EPA.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, a few days ago I set up a task force . . . to take a quick
and fresh look at the SPCC regulations. Certainly this incident brought to our attention certain portions of the regulations which we need to review . . . this program may be entirely too voluntary. We may need to tighten up these requirements
and make it clear that integrity testing, contingency planning and other components
of SPCC plans are requirements and not simply guidelines . . . In summary, Mr.
Chairman, I'm very concerned about this situation . . . We plan to revisit the
regulations.
Oil Spill on the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988) (statement of Dr. J. Winston Porter, Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, EPA).
39. Any facility that is subject to regulation by the EPA but meets the following two
requirements is not covered by this section: (1) if the underground tank storage capacity of the
facility is less than or equal to 42,000 gallons of petroleum and (2) if the above-ground tank
storage capacity is 1,320 gallons or less.of petroleum with no single tank being of a capacity of
more than 660 gallons. (See 40 CFR § 112.1(d)(2)). While this section excludes many small
operators, the fact remains that even a small amount of petroleum can damage the environment. "[E]ven relatively small tanks of a few thousand gallons can cause extreme damage.
The experience in Sioux Falls is a dramatic example." 135 CONG. REC. 5671, No. 6 Part III
(Jan. 25, 1989) (Statement of Sen. Daschle, South Dakota).

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:69

spill.40 The practical results are voluntary industry practices for the
regulation of the structural integrity of the tank itself.
In addition, the SPCC does not permit the EPA to intervene
when either the possibility of a discharge or an actual discharge
poses no dangers of reaching the navigable waters of the United
States.4 1 Such a situation occurred in the Williams Pipeline discharge,42 where the EPA could only provide minimal supervision,
and only after the Administrator had invoked emergency discretionary measures. As toxic spills are very difficult and costly to clean,
Congress should have concentrated on the prevention aspect rather
than the containment and cleaning aspects. Congress' failure in this
manner, as well as its creation of exceptions to its legislation has
resulted in the constant threat of toxic discharge from aboveground
storage tanks, notwithstanding the Clean Water Act of 1972. 41
IV.

THE WASTE MATERIALS MANAGEMENT ACT OF
(TITLE V § 501)41

1989

As past laws have not been completely successful in regulating
40. See 40 CFR § 11 2.7(b),(c). Most of the regulation is aimed at the ability to contain
and clean up a discharge. Only one subsection is designated for the prevention of a discharge:
Aboveground tanks should be subject to periodic integrity testing, taking into account tank design (floating roof, etc.) and using such techniques as hydrostatic testing, visual inspection or a system of non-destructive shell thickness testing. Comparison records should be kept where appropriate, and tank supports and foundations
should be included in these inspections. In addition, the outside of the tank should
frequently be observed by operating personnel for signs of deterioration, leaks which
might cause a spill, or accumulation of oil inside diked areas.
Id. at § 112.7(e)(2)(vi). Note that this section does not indicate what amount of time constitutes "periodic." Also, comparison records (which will highlight the existence of a problem
when they are properly examined) should be kept, not shall be kept, where appropriate. This
results in industry standards that are for all intents and purposes only voluntary. For definitions of some of the technical terms used in the above quote (such as "integrity testing"). See
Failure Investigation of Ashland Oil Tank No. 1338 at Floreffe, Pennsylvania, Battelle Report
June 17, 1988 at 15-25.
41. Born out of § 3110)(1)(C) and 311(j)(2) of the FWCPA (33 U.S.C.A. § 1321) is
Part 112 - OIL POLLUTION PREVENTION 40 CFR § 112. However, this section does not
apply if the threat posed by an onshore storage facility is not a reasonable threat to the navigable waters of the United States. (See 40 CFR § 112.1(d)(1)(i)). Note that this does not
exclude the civil penalties imposed by § 112.6 of up to $5,000 each day for a continuing

violation. See 40 CFR § 112.6.
42. See supra note 3, and accompanying text.
43. Once petroleum is spilled, it is very difficult to clean up. This is evidenced by a
fifteen to twenty percent recovery rate. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
44. H.R. 3735, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG REc. H9042 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1989)
(introduced by Representative Luken of Pennsylvania). The title of the proposed legislation is:
"To amend the SWDA (Solid Waste Disposal Act), to authorize appropriations for fiscal years
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the use of aboveground storage tanks, the Waste Materials Management Act of 1989 is currently being proposed in the House of Representatives"5 in an attempt to confront the problem."6 The bill contains additions to, amendments to, and reauthorizations of the
currently existing environmental laws. If passed, the Act will apply
to all tanks which commence operations six months subsequent to
the passing of the Act. 7 In addition, the EPA will set a timetable
for existing tanks to comply with the regulations. 8
The Waste Materials Management Act is an improvement over
current legislation. In the Act, more severe measures are taken to
decrease spills, and to quickly and more successfully clean them up.
The bill gives the EPA extensive power to regulate aboveground
storage tanks,"9 especially through sections 9102 and 9104, which
call for the Release Prevention Plan ("RPP") to regulate each tank
1990 to 1993, and for other purposes." Id.
45. The Senate version of the Tank Bill, introduced on January 25, 1989 by Senator
Daschle of South Dakota, is directly modeled on the current underground tank regulation in
RCRA. Members of the staffs of both Senators (Daschle of South Dakota and Heinz of Pennsylvania) have informed the author that the current legislation is beginning in the House by
Representatives Luken and Walgren of Pennsylvania. Therefore, this Note will not focus on
the Senate version of the Tank Bill, but solely on the Waste Materials Management Act of
1989.
At this point, the Safe Drinking Water Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 should be
mentioned. This Act has no effect on the regulation of above ground storage tanks. It applies
directly to the water systems and not to the source of supply for the water system. If the Safe
Drinking Water Act applied to the source of supply for the water systems, it is conceivable
that the Act would then encompass most of the environmental legislation that currently exists.
The Safe Drinking Water Act is a set of standards for the drinking water itself. The
treatment process is regulated through standards set for the water that comes out of home
faucets. The Act has some effect on the State permit process for underground injection of
wells. (The underground. injection of wells is beyond the scope of this article.)
46. The term " 'above-ground storage tank'... does not include any - - (A) agricultural
farm or residential tank of 4,200 gallons or less, (B) tank of 4,200 gallons or less capacity,
" The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989 § 9112(d)(4)(9)(A) and (B).
47. "Effective Date - - Regulations . . .shall be effective with respect to each aboveground storage tank which commences operation 6 months after the promulgation of the regulations." Id. at § 9101(c). Any tank that is under construction or in the process of relocation
will have to conform to the new regulatory standards if it will not be in operation within six
months after the regulation passes. If it does go into operation within the six month period, it
will eventually have to conform due to the retroactive aspect of The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989.
48. "Effective Date ... each . . .tank which commenced operations on or before the
effective date of such regulation, the Administrator shall issue regulations to set a timetable
for bringing tanks into compliance..." Id. at § 9101(c). The purpose is to eventually get all
aboveground storage tanks that are preexisting and not exempt them from the regulation.
49. Depending on eventual judicial interpretation (assuming the bill becomes law), the
bill will expressly or impliedly give the EPA power over the economic life of tank owners.
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or group of tanks.5 0 While similar to the SPCC, the RPP is more
effective since it provides for systematic inspections and modifications. 51 One RPP requirement is that adequate equipment and personnel must be on the site or reasonably available to act when there

is a discharge.52 If this provision had been in existence in the past,
much damage could have been avoided. For example, upon discovering the Ashland spill, fifteen hours had elapsed before equipment
was finally placed in the river.5" Consequently, the oil passed the first
dam located twelve miles down the river and rapidly emulsified.54
Had there been a requirement to use the proper equipment at the
site or to have such equipment readily available, the site could have
been cleaned sooner, resulting in a larger recovery.
It must be noted that the Coast Guard is required to maintain

Spill Cleanup Inventory known as SKIM.5 5 SKIM permits those in
50. The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989, § 9102(b).
51. The RPP is aimed at all erected (i.e., not fully assembled at the factory and transported to the field) aboveground storage tanks that are not under a regulatory exemption.
However, it is more extensive than the SPCC, which is aimed only at tanks that pose a threat
to the navigable waters of the United States. Id.
52. "The plan shall provide for adequate equipment and personnel to be on site or otherwise reasonably available to control and clean up any release of a regulated substance.
Id. at § 9102(b)(2).
53. "The first oil control boom of Ashlands primary contractor was not in the Water
until 15 hours after the spill." Oil Spill on the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers, Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Environmental Protectionof the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988) (statement of Representative Walgren of Pennsylvania). In addition to this delay, the EPA and the Coast Guard did not determine which agency
would take primary responsibility for directing the cleanup effort and the emergency response
until eighteen hours after the spill had occurred. Id. at 13.
54. When oil spills into water, the oil and water eventually mix and the oil emulsifies
into tiny droplets virtually impossible to recover. Most oil recovery equipment is designed to
contain the oil until it can be vacuumed up. However, when the spill is in a river, the current
makes it very difficult for the booms to contain the oil. The process of emulsification is greatly
enhanced when the oil is swept down the river by the current. In the case of the Ashland spill,
emulsification had begun before the cleanup equipment was even put into the water. "Riding
on 2-knot currents . . . the oil had passed the first lock and dam 12 miles downstream by the
time officials could get equipment on the river. Diesel fuel is much lighter than crude oil and it
emulsified rapidly in the river." Nichols, Oil Accident Ignites Response Debate, 60 J. OF
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FED'N 467, 467-68 (Apr. 1988). "In addition, it appears that
the cleanup equipment that was known is primarily designed for spills in open water, [it is] of
very questionable use in rivers where there is a fast current . . .[t]he Gulf Strike Force, one
of two in the Nation, has no equipment suitable for rivers." Oil Spill on the Monongahela and
Ohio Rivers, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1988) (statement of
Rep.Walgren of Pennsylvania).
55. [W]e have learned that the U.S. Coast Guard is required to maintain a current
Spill Cleanup Inventory known as SKIM. This is an inventory so that those in the
position of responding to an emergency can quickly find out what type of cleanup

1989]

TOXIC SPILL LEGISLATION

the position of responding to. an emergency to promptly determine
what type of cleaning equipment is available and where it is located." However, due to budgetary problems, the national equipment inventory has been defunct for the past few years. 7 Thus, the
RPP requirement that each tank owner must keep the proper equipment on hand or readily available is absolutely necessary.
The RPP also provides that each tank and system shall be inspected before operations can begin. The inspection must be certified
by a qualified professional engineer who is not permanently employed by the owner or operator of the system. This avoids any bias
on the part of the engineer as well as undue influence from the
owner or operator. 8 If the plan and system do not pass inspection,
the independent engineer must notify the EPA or the State where
the system is located."
When considering the RPP and the SPCC, it is apparent that
the RPP is more effective in preventing toxic spills. The SPCC required only that tanks be reviewed and certified by a registered professional engineer, not an independent engineer.6 " The SPCC also
equipment is available and where it is. The Coast Guard indicated in this case that
they had 12 vacuum trucks on hand; they needed 200.
In retrospect, we find out that the national equipment inventory has been defunct for
the last several years for budgetary reasons. The Coast Guard decided that this
inventory did not have the priority as a national function.
Oil Spill on the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13, 14 (1988) (statement of Rep. Walgren of Pennsylvania).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The bill provides, in relevant part, that:
[T] he plan and system shall be inspected by a qualified registered professional engineer not permanently employed by the owner or operator of the system . . . . If..-.
the engineer determines that the system . . . or , . . the tanks . . . do not comply
with the regulations . . . the engineer shall notify the Administrator [EPA] or the
State. Thereafter, each system, including each tank, shall be inspected while in service by a qualified inspector not less then once every three years.
The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989, § 9102(d). (The fact that the engineer must
be certified decreases the probability of fraudulent inspections. As the engineer must report
any failures to the EPA or the state, possible repercussions for failing to do such would also
serve as a disincentive to fraud).
59. Id.
60. The SPCC does not require that an independent engineer certify the plan. The only
requirement is that it be reviewed "by a Registered Professional Engineer and certified by such
Professional Engineer." 40 C.F.R. § 112.3(d)(1988). Under this regulation, the engineer can
be employed by the owner or operator thus increasing the probability of undue influence. However, the owner and operator is still required to implement such a plan in accordance with 40
C.F.R. § 112.3(a)(b) and (c).
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imposes no penalty if the plan does not pass. Thus, the RPP is the
better approach.
The RPP must also provide for a Release Prevention System
capable of catching and holding 110 percent of the full capacity of a
tank."1 The term "catch" refers to the ability to contain the wave
effect of a rupture. Such a provision would have prevented the damage which resulted from the Ashland spill.6 2 The containment dikes
around the Ashland tank were capable of holding 110 percent of the
capacity of the largest tank on the farm, but they were not able to
catch or contain the oil in response to the complete rupture and consequent wave which ultimately occurred.
Under the Waste Materials Management Act, if a major modification to a facility could materially increase the probability of discharge, the tanks may not operate until an engineer certifies that the
modification complies with good engineering practices."3 This is a
substantial improvement in the approach taken to prevent toxic
spills. Notwithstanding the fact that under SPCC a plan to change a
facility design must be completed within six months, and cannot effect its potential to discharge into navigational waters," a tank could
be operated in a potentially unsafe manner during the six month period prior to the plan's completion. The provision in the Waste
61. "RELEASE PREVENTION SYSTEM - - The release prevention plan developed under subsection (b) shall include a release prevention system that is capable of catching and holding
110 percent of the full capacity of the tank. The system shall prevent any release of regulated
substances beyond the boundaries of the property of the tank owner or operator, as defined in
the spill prevention plan." The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989, §9102(c).
62. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
63. MODIFICATIONS. [exist] . . . whenever there is a major modification in the
design, construction, operation or maintenance of the tank which materially affects
the potential for the tank to release substances. The regulations shall prohibit the
use or operation of the tank until the owner or operator has notified the Administrator . . . that the amended plan and system have been certified by a qualified registered professional engineer as reflecting good engineering practices.
The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989 § 9102(e). This provision, unlike the SPCC,
requires an amendment whenever there is a modification that affects the possibility of any
release, not just a release into navigable water. In addition, the tanks cannot operate until they
pass this inspection.
64. Owners or operators of facilities . . . shall amend the SPCC Plan for such
facility in accordance with § 112.7 whenever there is a change in facility design,
construction, operation or maintenance which materially affects the facility's potential for the discharge of oil into or upon the navigable waters of the United States
. . . Such amendments shall be fully implemented as soon as possible, but not later
than six months after such change occurs.
40 CFR § 112.5(a). This provision does not apply to facilities that do not pose a threat to
navigable waters of the United States. 40 C.F.R. § 112.
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Materials Management Act will prevent such unsafe use of a tank.6 5
The Waste Materials Management Act also gives the EPA, or a
state with an approved state program, the power to prevent a tank
that has discharged from operating until it is determined that no
danger to human health or the environment exists. 6
Another major advantage of The Waste Materials Management
Act is that it contains a provision whereby a state can assume primary enforcement authority, 7 provided state enforcement is at least
as stringent as federal regulation, and the state sufficiently funds the
program. The advantage of a state program is that the state may
apply more stringent requirements than those promulgated under the
Waste Materials Management Act. For example, the state can include aboveground storage tanks that are exempted by the Waste
Materials Management Act. 8 The EPA, however, can monitor the
state program to ensure that minimum federal requirements are met.
Thus, the EPA reserves concurrent regulatory authority in this
context.6 9
While the Waste Materials Management Act is a more effective
weapon against spills, it too has exemptions. Any aboveground tank
which holds less than 4,200 gallons is exempt, resulting in more ex65. However, the provision only applies to a "major modification," which is not defined
in the Act. As a result, the courts may eventually determine what constitutes a "major modification." The courts will most likely make determinations based on a modification's potential
threat of discharge. Thus, if the threat of discharge is increased, the modification will most
likely be deemed major, and hence fail under the regulation. Nevertheless, the fact that "major modification" is not defined gives a large amount of leeway to the EPA in determining
whether or not to bring the modification under the regulation.
66. "ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . .Requirements prohibiting the use or operation of
a tank after a release from that tank unless the Administrator (or the State in the case of an
approved State program) determines that such prohibition is not necessary to protect human
health and the environment." The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989, § 9102(f)(3).
This ability to shut down the operations of the discharging tank does not exist under the
SPCC. In addition, the EPA does not have the explicit power to shut down an underground
tank in the event of a discharge under the Regulation of Underground Storage Tanks in
RCRA, although this power may be inferred under 42 U.S.C. § 6991(b)(h)(l)(B) (part of
RCRA). The threat of having a tank shut down until the EPA deems that operation of the
tank would be safe for human health and the environment gives economic incentive for an
owner or operator to properly maintain his tanks.
67. The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989, § 9106. For a similar State Program in RCRA, see 42 U.S.C. § 6991(c) (West Supp. 1990).
68. Local enforcement is presumably cheaper and much more effective than federal enforcement, as a local authority knows the area and can thus regulate it efficiently. Examples of
state plans include the 'mini Superfunds' (State versions of CERCLA) and the 'little NEPA's'
(State versions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a).
69. The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989 § 9106(c).
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emptions than even RCRA.7 0 Consequently, there will be more potential loopholes in the regulatory scheme. Tank owners who would
like to install an underground tank with a capacity of over 1,100
gallons (but under 4,200 gallons) can avoid subjecting themselves to
the regulation if they are willing to compromise and install an
aboveground tank.71
Another exemption from the Waste Materials Management Act
are releases of small quantities of regulated substances, provided
however that they "will not present a substantial danger to human
70. Under the current RCRA underground tank regulations, tanks of 1,100 gallons or
less are exempted from the regulation 42 U.S.C. § 6991(l)(A).
71. Unfortunately, a national inventory of aboveground tanks does not exist. Oil Spill on
the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Comm. on Environmental Public Works, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (Feb. 4, 1988). As
such, it is impossible to determine with certainty which tank owners predominately fall outside
the reach of the Waste Materials Management Act. It seems logical to assume however that
most non-commercial aboveground tanks have less than a 4,200 gallon capacity and are located on farms and private residences. In all likelihood, regulations directed specifically towards these tanks would be impractical. Additionally, unlike those responsible for large commercial tank farms, personal property owners are likely to be diligent in protecting their own
property. (As a result, they are likely to indirectly comply with regulations from which they
are exempt). Disregarding possible CERCLA liability, human nature suggests that a farmer
will be more diligent in the protection of his land from pollution. The farmer's land and skills
are his economic assets, and if he pollutes his land, his skills will not be of any use. In addition,
a landowner (especially a farmer) does not want to live on land that is polluted. If the land is
polluted, the landowner may be personally liable for the costs of cleanup under RCRA, the
new proposed legislation or possibly even CERCLA.
If a corporate officer does not live on corporate land (which is usually the case), and the
company does not need the land to be in an unpolluted condition (unlike the farmer), there is
less of an incentive to keep the land unpolluted and therefore more of a need to regulate
corporate tanks. This point is further strengthened by the fact that an officer's personal assets
generally cannot be attached for the cost of cleaning a site since the corporate veil is very hard
to pierce.
The effect of piercing a corporate veil is to hold the owner [of the corporation]
liable. This rationale for piercing the corporate veil is that the corporation is something less then a bona fide independent entity.
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Co., 810 F.2d at 744 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978)).
Fortunately, the current legislation does provide an alternative to piercing the corporate
veil. Under CERCLA, an employee can be held individually liable if he actually participated
in the CERCLA violation, (for example, if he actually arranges the transportation and disposal of a hazardous substance in violation of CERCLA.) See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)(1983 &
Supp. 1990). Also, under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (West Supp. 1986), a corporate officer
can be held individually liable for contributing to an imminent and substantial endangerment
to health and the environment, even if the officer did not actually participate in the violative
conduct. Thus, a corporate officer does have some personal incentive to act diligently. As such,
it can be argued that the logic behind the exemptions of smaller tanks under the Waste Materials Management Act is somewhat negated.
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health and the environment."" 2 Additionally, the EPA is given the
power to exempt particular tanks or classes of tanks that need not be
regulated by the Act. 73 However, these exemptions are clearly necessary from a practical standpoint, and will not have a negative impact
upon the Act.
The Act contains an additional shortcoming by providing the
EPA with a great amount of discretion in determining the appropriate course of action when the regulations are violated. If the EPA
finds an owner or operator in violation of the Act, it can: 1) issue a
compliance order; 2) start a civil action; or 3) issue an order prohibiting operation of all or part of the facility.7 ' However, the EPA is
not required to act. Moreover, if a state has elected to implement its
own program, the EPA is only required to give a state notice of a
violation occurring within its borders. Even then, the state is not re72. "The regulations may exempt releases of small quantities of regulated substances
which the Administrator determines by rule will not present a substantial danger to human
health and the environment." The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989, § 9101(a)(2).
Economically it is not feasible to clean every single spill without regard to the size. For
example, the amount of petroleum spilled at each gas station from overfilling could never be
adequately regulated by any agency, and would not be dangerous by itself. Yet, while the
small amount probably would not cause any harm to the gas station, it would be a "substantial
danger" if spilled into a previously unpolluted area such as a small mountain stream. There
will be a minimal effect on humans if a small mountain stream is slightly polluted, but the
effect on the fish that live in the stream and the animals that drink from it would be much
more pronounced. Thus, the exception is necessary, and if used correctly, should not deter
from the purpose and goals of the Waste Materials Management Act.
73. "The [EPA] also may exempt particular tanks or classes of tanks from any requirements of this part if the [EPA] determines that an alternative system or procedure adequately
protects human health and the environment." The Waste Materials Management Act of 1989,
§ 9101(a)(2).
74. Under this Act, the EPA has the choice not to act when it finds a violator.
(a) COMPLIANCE. - - (1) EPA ORDERS AND CIVIL ACTIONS. - - Except as provided
in paragraph (2), whenever, on the basis of any information the Administrator determines that any person is in violation of any requirement of this part, the Administrator may issue an order requiring compliance within a reasonable specified time
period or the Administrator may commence a civil action in the United States district court in which the violation occurred for appropriate relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction. The Administrator may also issue an order prohibiting the use or operation of all or any portion of the facility where a tank is located
after a release from the tank until the Administrator (or the State in the case of an
approved State program) determines that such prohibition is not necessary to protect human health and the environment or that adequate corrective action has been
taken. (2) NOTICE To STATE. - - In the case of a violation of any requirement of
this part where such violation occurs in a State with a program approved under this
part, the Administrator shall give notice to the State in which such violation has
occurred prior to issuing an order or commencing a civil action under this section
(emphasis added).
Id. at § 9107(l),(2).
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quired to take action. This inevitably leads to a lack of national uniformity. Unfortunately, the exemption is one that might severely
weaken the Act. Businessmen would most likely look to operate in
states where the Act is not strictly enforced. As a result, the environmentally conscious states would be harmed. This will likely lead to
states ceasing strict enforcement of its regulation. Additionally, the
EPA may cause adverse effects upon the business of one state by
strictly enforcing the Act in that region and not in others. Thus, the
Act would be more effective if some discretion in its enforcement
were taken from the EPA and the states.
Despite the aforementioned shortcomings, The Waste Materials
Management Act of 1989 is clearly an improvement over current
regulation. Aboveground storage tanks are a danger not adequately
covered by current legislation. Even though the Act is weakened by
some of the exemptions as well as the amount of discretion given to
the EPA and the states, in its entirety, it is a vast improvement over
the other legislation.
CONCLUSION

Current regulations of aboveground toxic storage tanks are not
sufficient. If compliance with the regulations were enforced, it is possible that new regulations would not be necessary. 5 Seven out of ten
EPA regions have never issued a penalty, although violations have
been found. 6 For example, in Region III headquartered in Philadelphia, 74% of the facilities inspected had violations." Even if current
regulations were fully complied with, it is possible that additional
regulations would still be needed, as the current regulations do not
cover all aboveground tanks.7 8 The Waste Materials Management
Act is an attempt to fill this legislative gap. Although the Act has
some problems, it makes an admirable attempt to include all
aboveground tanks. Conversely, while CERCLA, RCRA, and
FWPCA adequately regulate what they purport to regulate, the
problem with the Acts are what they do not purport to regulate. The
Waste Materials Management Act of 1989 better regulates spills.
Accordingly, it is the strongest of the four Acts despite the fact that
75. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Arlen Specter,
U.S. Senate, Inland Oil Spills: Stronger Regulation and Enforcement Needed to Avoid Future
Incidents at 23-9.
76. Id. at 27.
77. Id. at 25.
78. Id. at 17-22.

1989]

TOXIC SPILL LEGISLATION

87

it may provide too many exemptions from what it regulates. However, the CERCLA, RCRA, FWPCA and the Waste Material Management Act together may adequately regulate storage tanks.
Brad Robbins

